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SPANDREL OR FRANKENSTEIN’S MONSTER? THE VICES
AND VIRTUES OF RETROFITTING IN AMERICAN LAW
MICHAEL C. DORF*
INTRODUCTION
Ancient mythology, literary fiction, and modern science fiction
films all recount a similar cautionary tale: human ingenuity gives
rise to a powerful invention, but through human fallibility and, in
some tellings, venality, the invention becomes a monster and turns
on its creators. Perhaps the most famous example is Mary Shelley’s
Frankenstein, in which Dr. Frankenstein’s attempt to fashion a
living man from the dead remains of others succeeds, only then to
go horribly awry.1 Such stories are timeless because they warn of
* Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I thank Sherry Colb, Neal
Devins, Scott Dodson, Ted Eisenberg, Michael Green, George Hay, Ori Herstein, Nathan
Oman, Jason Solomon, and Timothy Zick for very helpful comments. Alison Skaife provided
excellent research assistance. This Essay is based on my James Gould Cutler Memorial
Lecture at William & Mary Law School.
1. MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (1818). The Prometheus story is an
ancient version of this cautionary tale. See Olga Raggio, The Myth of Prometheus, 21 J.
WARBURG & COURTAULD INSTS. 44, 44 (1958) (describing Prometheus—who gave fire to
mortals—as “the destroyer of a happy original state, a golden age when men lived ‘remote and
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the dangers of indelible features of human nature: hubris and short-
sightedness. Recent large-scale catastrophes such as the 2010
Deepwater Horizon Gulf oil spill and the 2011 tsunami-induced
radiation leakage at the Fukushima nuclear power facility are only
the latest reminders of the limits of human ingenuity and the
continuing relevance of the Frankenstein story.
But if the unintended consequences of human ingenuity can
sometimes prove disastrous, at other times, they may turn out to be
felicitous. We are all familiar with accidental inventions like peni-
cillin,2 Post-it Notes,3 and the microwave oven.4 Spandrels are a
more whimsical example. A spandrel is the space between a curved
arch and a rectangular boundary;5 although an artifact of architec-
ture and geometry, since ancient times, artists and architects have
used spandrels to enhance the beauty of buildings.6
We see a similar process in nature: evolution, or in the case of
human culture, our own artifice, retrofits organs and capacities that
were originally selected for one purpose to serve some very different
purpose. Feathers evolved as insulation but proved useful for flight.7
Evolutionary biologists debate the causal origins of sophisticated
human language,8 but it certainly did not evolve to enable the
writing of sonnets or the delivery of lectures on law. The late
free from toil and heavy sickness’”). The Frankenstein story itself resembles the golem myth.
See Trevor Pinch, Science as Golem, ACADEME, Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 16, 16 (stating that “[a]
golem is a hybrid creature of Jewish mythology made out of clay by human hands” that, when
uncontrolled, can “destroy its masters”). Modern science fiction films that explore this theme
include The Matrix, THE MATRIX (Warner Brothers Pictures 1999), and The Terminator, THE
TERMINATOR (Hemdale Film Corporation 1984). In both films, and many other science fiction
stories, machines created to serve humans end up attacking. 
2. David Ho, Bacteriologist Alexander Fleming, TIME, Mar. 29, 1999, at 117, available
at www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,990612,00.html. 
3. Art Fry & Spencer Silver, First Person: ‘We Invented the Post-it Note,’ FIN. TIMES MAG.,
Dec. 3, 2010, available at www.ft.com/cms/s/2/f08e8a9a-fcd7-11df-ae2d-00144feab49a.html.
4. DAVID E. BROWN, INVENTING MODERN AMERICA 80 (2002).
5. Spandrel Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
spandrel (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
6. See S.J. Gould & R.C. Lewontin, The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian
Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme, 205 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON
SERIES B 581, 581-83 (1979).
7. Carl Zimmer, The Long Curious Extravagant Evolution of Feathers, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 2011, at 32, 39, available at http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2011/02/
feathers/zimmer-text. 
8. See CHRISTINE KENNEALLY, THE FIRST WORD: THE SEARCH FOR THE ORIGINS OF
LANGUAGE 8-10 (2007). 
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evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould popularized the term
“exaptation” to refer to this phenomenon, expressly analogizing it to
spandrels in architecture.9
So much for literature, science, and art. Let me turn now to
something about which I am more qualified to express an opinion:
law. The law contains numerous examples of retrofitting. Legal
institutions, doctrines, and texts that were originally thought to
serve one purpose can come to serve quite different purposes.
Consider the jury. We think that the role of the jury is to rep-
resent the common sense and values of the community in finding
the facts and applying the law.10 In doing so, jurors must avoid
bias.11 Thus, lawyers and judges question prospective jurors to weed
out those with experiences or prior relationships with parties or
witnesses that might interfere with their ability to make a decision
solely based on the law and the evidence presented in court.12
Yet the medieval English jury—from which our modern jury
evolved13—was composed of people from the locale in which the
disputed events took place precisely because local jurors would have
knowledge of the facts and parties based on their prior relation-
ships.14 In other words, medieval jurors served both of the functions
now served by jurors and witnesses. What we would now call a
juror’s disqualifying bias was the very characteristic that rendered
medieval jurors qualified to sit in judgment.
9. Stephen J. Gould & Elisabeth S. Vrba, Exaptation—A Missing Term in the Science of
Form, 8 PALEOBIOLOGY 4, 6 (1982) (“We suggest that such characters, evolved for other usages
(or for no function at all), and later ‘coopted’ for their current role, be called exaptations.”); see
also Gould & Lewontin, supra note 6, at 587 (“One must not confuse the fact that a structure
is used in some way (consider again the spandrels ... ) with the primary evolutionary reason
for its existence and conformation.”).
10. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). 
11. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233-34 (1978).
12. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that
the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury should not allow a verdict to stand under
circumstances in which a juror is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial);
Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 511 (1948) (noting that courts have a duty “to see that
the jury as finally selected is subject to no solid basis of objection on the score of
impartiality”).
13. See Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Underappreciated
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 592 (1993).
14. See John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law, 17 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 313, 314 (1973).
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Does that mean that the modern jury is normatively unjustified?
Not necessarily. A post hoc rationalization can nonetheless be a
good justification. Still, the knowledge that some legal institution or
practice that we take for granted was originally understood to serve
purposes wholly unrelated to its contemporary justification should
at least give us pause. Reflecting on the accidental quality of our
institutions and practices can be a first step toward examining their
efficacy relative to other possible arrangements.
In this Lecture, I shall provide additional examples of retrofitting
of the sort just described: legal doctrines, texts, and practices that
initially served one purpose coming to serve some quite different
purpose. My methodology in this Lecture is chiefly descriptive. I aim
to show that legal retrofitting is relatively common. I also hope to
shed some new light on old debates by recasting them as contests
over the legitimacy of legal retrofitting.
Whether we view any particular example of retrofitting as cre-
ating a Frankenstein’s monster or a beautiful spandrel will depend
on the views we hold about the sources of law’s authority and dis-
puted matters of interpretive methodology. Because views about
such matters will sometimes vary with the type of law at issue, I
give separate consideration in this Lecture to examples drawn from
the common law, statutes, and the Constitution.
I. COMMON LAW RETROFITTING
I begin with the common law. To illustrate and evaluate span-
drels and Frankenstein’s monsters in the common law, I shall take
my cue from three of our greatest judges: Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., Benjamin Cardozo, and Learned Hand.
Both Holmes and Cardozo warned of the Frankensteinish ten-
dencies of the common law. Holmes famously wrote in The Path of
the Law:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
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since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the
past.15
Changed circumstances without a corresponding change in the law,
Holmes says, can thus render monstrous what was once a useful
invention.16
Moreover, a once-justified legal principle can become a monster
even without changed circumstances, simply through the internal
dynamics of the law. Cardozo described this dynamic in The Nature
of the Judicial Process.17 The common law, he said, is ideally a
synthesis of multiple methodologies.18 To fill gaps and answer novel
questions, the common law method melds “philosophy” (by which
Cardozo meant abstract reasoning), historical inquiry into the ori-
gins of legal rules and principles, attention to custom, and express
consideration of public policy.19 In the hands of the right judge, the
vices of each of these different modes of analysis counteract one
another.20 Yet sometimes judges write opinions that emphasize one
or another mode of reasoning to the exclusion of others.21 That can
be especially dangerous when the judge overemphasizes the
“philosophical” mode. Within that domain, Cardozo observed “[t]he
tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic.”22 If
there it comes to rest, all is well, but “philosophical” common law
reasoning can run amuck. Cardozo noted that when not held in
check by other factors, the human mind, including, perhaps espe-
cially, the human judicial mind, will exhibit a “constant striving ...
for a larger and more inclusive unity, in which differences will be
reconciled, and abnormalities will vanish.”23
Of course, the law cannot really reconcile all differences and make
abnormalities vanish. Cardozo was describing the way in which the
common law sometimes lumps together disparate phenomena. For
example, we treat a one-time bilateral arms-length transaction for
15. O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
16. See id.
17. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
18. See id. at 64-67.
19. See id. at 51-67.
20. See id. at 64-68.
21. Cf. id. at 53.
22. Id. at 51.
23. Id. at 50.
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the sale of personal property and a long-term multilateral agree-
ment among repeat players as both governed by the “law of con-
tract.”24 Too much lumping untempered by the splitting impulse of
the turn to history, custom, and policy, Cardozo warned, can lead to
a Frankenstein’s monster.25
Fortunately, the tendency of the common law towards over-
lumping is very often tempered by life’s messiness. Holmes made
that point in his frequently quoted observation that “[t]he life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience.”26 Holmes himself
was not consistent in his thinking on this point. The not-logic-but-
experience line emphasizes particularities and differences. Yet in
other writings, Holmes championed legal doctrines that would
flatten differences and abnormalities. For example, in a charming
and no doubt apocryphal story in The Path of the Law, Holmes
mockingly described a Vermont judge who searched the law books
in vain for the law applicable to churns in order to resolve a dispute
over a broken churn.27 In an insightful discussion of this story,
Professor Schauer astutely observed that insofar as Holmes was
making a prediction that the law would increasingly use legal
rather than prelegal categories, he may well have been wrong:
“[W]hen we observe the ‘path’ of the law” over the last century,
Schauer writes, “what we see is not the increasing utility of such
trans-doctrinal categories, but rather their decreasing utility, and
the increasing use of statutes, regulations, and common law
principles that hook onto relatively specific parts of the prelegal
world.”28
If the last century of legal developments has seen a movement
away from overlumping, that is not to say that the law never
overlumps anymore. What Cardozo described as the “philosophical”
instinct remains strong among judges, in no small part because it
still dominates legal education.29 It is easy for law professors such
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. f (1981).
25. See CARDOZO, supra note 17, at 64-65.
26. O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
27. See Holmes, supra note 15, at 474-75.
28. Frederick Schauer, Prediction and Particularity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773, 781 (1998).
29. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy
Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 181-82 (2006) (explaining the influence of
philosophy on legal scholarship).
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as myself to pose relatively abstract hypothetical questions to a
room full of law students in order to elicit the best rule; it is con-
siderably more difficult to provide insight into the enormous variety
of prelegal life worlds that may call for distinctive legal regimes.
Thus, young lawyers leave law school trained in the slicing and
dicing of Holmes’s legal categories rather than the prelegal catego-
ries to which Schauer points.30
To the extent that the tendency of the common law to lump
disparate phenomena into ill-fitting legal categories goes unchecked
by the countervailing pressure of other modes of common law
reasoning, the common law can grow monstrous. In some circum-
stances, the resulting law is monstrous from an ethical perspective.
For example, in the slave states of the antebellum United States,
enslaved human beings were treated as a species of personal
property.31
I should be clear that I am not saying that the common law clas-
sification of enslaved human beings as property was the primary
cause of slavery. The law mostly reflects social attitudes and polit-
ical interests.32 However, causation runs in both directions. Law
both shapes and is shaped by public attitudes, politics, and economic
and social institutions.33 Thus, when the law turns monstrous, the
impact may be widely felt.
30. See Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It,
60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 610 (2007).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Amy, 24 F. Cas. 792, 810 (C.C.D. Va. 1859) (No. 14,445)
(holding that a slave’s imprisonment for mail theft was a constitutional deprivation of the
slave owner’s property rights “although the [imprisonment] may render the property of the
master of little or no value”). See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 367 (James Madison)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“But we must deny the fact that slaves are considered merely as
property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that they
partake of both these qualities; being considered by our laws, in some respects, as persons,
and in other respects, as property.”); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff,
Property First, Humanity Second: The Recognition of the Slave’s Human Nature in Virginia
Civil Law, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 514 (1989) (stating that any consideration of the human
nature of slave property was considered by the Virginia court “only up to the point that it
began to encroach on the property rights of the owner”). 
32. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 749,
756-58 (2009).
33. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-
Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State,
45 DUKE L.J. 849, 851 (1996).
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I have just used the notion of a legal monster to connote ethical
monstrosity, but the phenomenon to which I mean to allude is much
broader. In general, when I say that the common law may spawn a
Frankenstein’s monster, all I mean is that some legal doctrine is ill
suited to its contemporary needs, either because the doctrine has
outlived its usefulness—Holmes’s worry34—or because a useful doc-
trine or approach has expanded to domains to which it is ill suited
—Cardozo’s worry.35
If the common law spawns Frankenstein’s monsters, it also
provides us with beautiful spandrels. Consider Judge Hand’s signal
contribution to tort law—the so-called Hand Formula, which defines
the duty of care as a duty to take precautions that are cheaper than
the probabilistically discounted value of the harm those precautions
aim to avert.36 I call the Hand Formula a spandrel because prior tort
law did not generally define the duty of care explicitly in cost-benefit
terms.37 Yet Hand—and to an even greater extent, subsequent schol-
ars and judges committed to the law and economics approach to tort
law—reconceptualized tort duties so that they would thenceforth be
understood in economic terms.38 Tort duties that emerged over the
34. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
36. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (“[I]f
the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether
B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.”).
37. See Patrick J. Kelley, The Carroll Towing Company Case and the Teaching of Tort
Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 731, 746 (2001) (differentiating the Hand Formula from prior
negligence standards by noting that “courts explaining the negligence standard in the 1920s
and 1930s ordinarily referred to the conduct of the ordinary reasonable man, not to the
conduct that poses an unreasonable foreseeable risk of harm to another” (citing WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 224-55 (1941))); Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A.
Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 588 (2002) (“The history of the development of the negligence standard
in the early nineteenth century suggests that the ordinary reasonable person standard of
conduct was adopted in order to preserve the jury’s historic role in judging the wrongfulness
of the defendant’s conduct in tort actions.” (second emphasis added)); Gary T. Schwartz, Tort
Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717,
1775 (1981) (disputing the efficiency theory for nineteenth-century tort law based on an
analysis of nineteenth-century tort cases in California and New Hampshire, which show that
the common law focused on victim protection). 
38. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); WILLIAM M.LANDES
& RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); Richard A. Posner,
A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Richard A. Posner, The Economic
Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757 (1975). 
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course of decades and even centuries to serve diverse, sometimes
forgotten purposes were rerationalized in a way that would then
adapt tort law to modern ends.
Some of my audience will no doubt be suppressing the urge to
shout out something like this: “But the law and economics approach
to tort law is no spandrel. It’s a Frankenstein’s monster!” There is
a robust debate within tort law scholarship over the extent, if any,
to which tort duties should be understood as serving to minimize the
net costs of accidents plus precautions against accidents—as implied
by the Hand Formula and law and economics more broadly39—or
whether it should instead be understood as serving other goals, such
as corrective justice,40 or simply serving as a “law of wrongs.”41
I confess that as a scholar of constitutional law rather than tort
law, I do not have a well-informed view about this debate. I do know
enough about the debate to be able to recognize that it has both a
descriptive and a normative dimension: the tort theorists argue
about whose theory provides the most descriptively accurate account
of the extant tort duties and whose theory is most normatively
attractive.42 Knowing what I know about human psychology, I am
willing to guess that the normative views of the participants in the
debate influence their respective descriptive views. Thus, without
ruling out the possibility that a resolution to the descriptive debate
could occur, I shall focus my attention on the normative.
Let us suppose that tort law as it came down to American judges
by the middle of the twentieth century was a jumble of doctrines
susceptible to a variety of rationalizations. To use categories intro-
duced by Professor Dworkin, let us imagine, in other words, that a
considerable variety of tort theories—from law and economics to
corrective justice—could be considered sufficiently good “fits” for tort
39. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 382-83 (1992); George P. Fletcher,
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 538 (1972) (characterizing tort law
as “a unique repository of intuitions of corrective justice”); Stephen R. Perry, On the
Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive Justice, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 237, 239 (Jeremy Horder ed., 4th ed. 2000) (grounding tort law in corrective
justice).
41. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917,
917-18 (2010) (arguing that tort law should not be understood as “accident-law-plus” but as
“a law of wrongs and recourse”).
42. See id. at 920.
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doctrine. The key question would then be which theory best justifies
tort doctrine.43
But now it looks like the question of whether some body of law or
theory rationalizing the law should be counted as a hideous Franken-
stein’s monster or a beautiful spandrel is mostly just a question of
what one thinks about the body of law or rationalizing theory as a
normative matter. If you are a utilitarian, you will regard the Hand
Formula as a spandrel. If you are a deontologist, you are more likely
to regard it as a Frankenstein’s monster.44
In saying that the question of whether a repurposed law is beau-
tiful or ugly depends on the judge’s notions of beauty or ugliness, I
hope I shall not be understood to have undermined the entire enter-
prise of identifying monsters and spandrels. If there really is no
reason for a rule other than that it was laid down at the time of
Henry IV, then everyone concerned today will agree that the rule is
a monster. Or, consider another straightforward example: despite
continued controversy over the proper scope and limits on class
actions, the modern doctrine—which views class actions as a mech-
anism for efficiently aggregating and resolving large numbers of
claims45—makes considerably more sense in today’s world than did
its common law forebear, which required persons litigating as a
class to form a coherent social group.46 To that extent, at least, there
43. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, at vii (1986) (“[O]ur law consists in the best
justification of our legal practices as a whole.”).
44. I say “more likely” rather than “certain” because deontology relates to moral duties,
whereas the non-law-and-economics approaches to tort law tend to distinguish moral duties
from legal duties. See Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 B.U.
L. REV. 273, 273-75, 288 (1996) (defining deontology and comparing it to other approaches to
tort law). Still, the two are closely related. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 41, at 953
(“[W]hen a judge makes clear that she is talking about legal duties when she is deciding a
case, not moral duties, she is indicating that she is identifying obligations within an
institutionally entrenched web.... [T]he articulation of the terms that constitute this web will
often require the use of reasoning of a sort commonly deployed in discerning moral duties.”).
45. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 148 (1982) (noting that the
“principal purpose” of class action is “the efficiency and economy of litigation” (quoting Am.
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974))).
46. See Susan T. Spence, Looking Back ... in a Collective Way: A Short History of Class
Action Law, BUS. L. TODAY, July-Aug. 2002, at 21, 22 (“Unlike many modern American
classes, the early English classes were cohesive. Class members lived, worked and worshiped
together. They were aware of the dispute and might even have played a part in selecting class
representatives.”); Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History
of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 872-77 (1977) (stating that the people involved in
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can be agreement that the modern class action is a spandrel, not a
monster.
Still, in a great many instances, there will not be consensus, and
the common law judge will have freedom to decide whether to
embrace some new understanding of the law as a spandrel or to
reject some old one as a monster—even as other judges might adopt
other approaches. That basic legal realist fact in turn raises a
familiar legitimacy question: should judges rather than legislators
be charged with the task of modernizing outdated legal doctrines? 
That very question would have been regarded by most judges as
backwards a century ago.47 Despite the proliferation of Progressive
Era legislation, in the early twentieth century, the courts still took
the common law as presumptively legitimate, viewing statutes as an
unwelcome polluting element to be isolated as much as possible
from the common law.48 Dean Pound bluntly criticized the old
approach, arguing that there was no good justification for “[t]he
proposition that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be
construed strictly.”49 Interestingly, Pound viewed the nonderogation
principle itself as a kind of Frankenstein’s monster: he thought the
principle made some sense in England, where it originated, because
it served as a lone safeguard against legislative overreaching, given
that English courts lacked the power of judicial review under a
written constitution.50 Transplanted to the United States, however,
the nonderogation principle was unnecessary, in light of the pre-
sumption in favor of construing statutes consistently with the
Constitution.51
Today, most states have abolished the principle favoring strict
construction of statutes in derogation of the common law.52 In the
collective litigation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—groups of manorial tenants,
villagers, and parishioners—existed as social entities independent of the lawsuit).
47. See Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 383-84 (1908)
(“It is fashionable to preach the superiority of judge-made law.”).
48. See id. (noting that twentieth-century courts “incline to ignore important legislation”).
49. Id. at 387.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4 (West 2012) (“The rule of the common law, that statutes
in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code.”); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2 (West 2012) (“[T]he rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation
thereof, shall be strictly construed, shall not be applicable to any general statute of Oklahoma;
but all such statutes shall be liberally construed to promote their object.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE
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postrealist world that the likes of Holmes, Cardozo, and Pound
helped to create, we understand that common law judging is rife
with questions of policy. We nonetheless accept the enterprise as
legitimate for a number of reasons: first, with the demise of the
nonderogation principle, judge-made common law now serves only
to establish default rules that can be changed by legislation;53
second, American lawyers retain their skepticism of the continental
pretense that a civil code can ever be complete,54 and so we value
judicial adjustment of common law rules as serving a necessary
function of interstitial lawmaking; and third, whether directly
elected or appointed through processes that filter—but still reflect—
public opinion, judges bring to their task a measure of democratic
legitimacy.
II. STATUTORY RETROFITTING
The common law may provide the oldest examples of legal rules
and standards either outliving their usefulness or being adapted to
serve unintended goals, but for some time now, we have been
living in an age of statutes.55 Thus, it would not be surprising if we
ANN. § 312.006 (West 2011) (“(a) The Revised Statutes are the law of this state and shall be
liberally construed to achieve their purpose and to promote justice. (b) The common law rule
requiring strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law does not apply to the
Revised Statutes.”). 
53. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
54. See Lewis A. Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down: James Coolidge Carter and the
Anticlassical Jurisprudence of Anticodification, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149, 212-13 (2007)
(discussing Jerome Frank’s comparison of the belief in a man-made code that is exhaustive
and final to a dream, “[f]or only a dream-code can anticipate all possible legal disputes and
regulate them in advance” (quoting JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 203-04
(1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Maurice E. Harrison, The First Half-Century of
the California Civil Code, 10 CALIF. L. REV. 185, 189 (1922) (stating that John Norton
Pomeroy contended that the continental theory of code interpretation was inapplicable to the
California Civil Code, which “does not embody the whole law concerning private relations,
rights and duties; it is incomplete, imperfect and partial”); Aniceto Masferrer, The Passionate
Discussion Among Common Lawyers About Postbellum American Codification: An Approach
to Its Legal Argumentation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173, 200 (2008) (stating that James Coolidge
Carter believed that “a complete code was simply incompatible with justice, for no code could
ever contain a sufficient number of rules to fairly resolve every dispute that might arise”). 
55. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)
(proposing methods for adapting the common law to the ubiquity of statutes).
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were to find that statutes themselves can become spandrels or
Frankenstein’s monsters.
I begin with examples of statutes changing through a comedy of
combined judicial and legislative errors. My Cornell Law School
colleague Professor Eisenberg has documented a particularly inter-
esting case. He notes that 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which is now known
primarily as an attorney fee provision for civil rights cases, also
contains what “appears to be a choice-of-law provision instructing
federal courts hearing civil rights cases to fill the inevitable gaps in
federal statutes with compatible state law.”56 But that seems
puzzling. The original version of § 1988 was adopted in 1866.57
Given Congress’s extreme distrust of the states during Reconstruc-
tion, why would it have given states the opportunity to undermine
federal civil rights policy through hostile interpretations of state
law?
The answer, Eisenberg argues, is that Congress did no such
thing.58 The original language was intended as an instruction to
federal courts hearing state causes of action to apply state law, but
that instruction was inadvertently generalized when an ostensibly
nonsubstantive recodification of the United States Code in 1874
separated substantive, procedural, and jurisdictional provisions.59
Consequently, the limited nature of the choice-of-law instruction—
and the underlying mistrust of states on matters of federal civil
rights—were lost. A statutory provision enacted to combat the Black
Codes has been transformed, ironically, into one that expands the
influence of state law.60 As currently interpreted, it is a Franken-
stein’s monster.
Section 1988 is not the only federal statute that has been changed
through combined judicial and legislative inattentiveness. Consider
the Anti-Injunction Act, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Putting
aside a minor stylistic revision and the codification of judge-made
exceptions, the critical language in the modern statute reproduces
56. Theodore Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights Cases: The Proper Scope of
Section 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 499 (1980).
57. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (2006)).
58. Eisenberg, supra note 56, at 540-41.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 535-36.
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a provision, first articulated in the original 1793 version of the Act,61
forbidding federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings.62
Modern case law treats the Anti-Injunction Act as reflecting a
Founding Era judgment about federalism. Here is how Justice
Hugo Black expounded what he supposed to be the policy of the
Anti-Injunction Act in a 1970 case:
When this Nation was established by the Constitution, each
State surrendered only a part of its sovereign power to the
national government. But those powers that were not surren-
dered were retained by the States and unless a State was
restrained by “the supreme Law of the Land” as expressed in the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, it was free
to exercise those retained powers as it saw fit. One of the
reserved powers was the maintenance of state judicial systems
for the decision of legal controversies.63
Black continued by invoking the Madisonian Compromise to suggest
that the Anti-Injunction Act, if not quite constitutionally required,
was tied up in constitutional policies.64 Because Article III and the
Supremacy Clause treat state courts as constitutionally adequate
fora for the resolution of all disputes, including those arising under
federal law, the Anti-Injunction Act tells federal courts to respect
the autonomy of state courts—or so Justice Black read the Act.65
That is a nice story, but the truth appears to be rather different.
As Professor Mayton has explained, the 1793 Act that contained
what we now call the Anti-Injunction Act included that language as
an exception to a provision that granted individual Supreme Court
Justices the power to grant injunctions, and thus was likely in-
tended to bar only single Justices from granting injunctions against
state court proceedings.66 The subsequent reading of the relevant
language as a freestanding prohibition on the granting of certain
61. Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 333.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).
63. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 285 (1970).
64. Id. at 285-87.
65. See id. at 285 (citing the compromise that gave Congress the power to decide whether
to create any lower federal courts).
66. William T. Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under the Anti-Injunction Statute, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 330, 333 (1978).
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injunctions by all federal courts appears to have been partly the
result of the inadvertent replacement of a colon with a semicolon
when the handwritten bill was printed.67 Unaware of the error, the
Supreme Court in 1849 accepted the argument of counsel that the
Anti-Injunction Act indeed was a general bar on federal courts
enjoining state court proceedings.68
But then a funny thing happened. When Congress recodified the
key language in 1874, it separated that language from the materials
authorizing actions by single Justices.69 Moreover, to remove any
doubt, Congress expressly specified that the prohibition applied to
“any court of the United States,” not just single Justices.70 What
began as an erroneous reading of a federal statute was thus for-
mally ratified.
So, is the Anti-Injunction Act a Frankenstein’s monster or a
spandrel? The answer to that question has almost nothing to do
with the law’s historical origins. Even if we all agree that the 1793
version of the Act should have been read only to limit the powers of
individual Justices,71 Congress was entitled to look at the misread-
ing and decide that it made sense. Congress was even entitled to
make that judgment, as it apparently did, without any knowledge
of the original purpose of the language. Whether the Anti-Injunction
Act is a monster, a spandrel, or something in between, depends on
what one thinks of the substance of the Act.
The two foregoing examples of statutory retrofitting involved
interactions between the courts and Congress. But we can also find
examples of courts acting even when Congress, having written the
initial statute, leaves the field. The transformation of antitrust law
beginning in the 1970s provides a close parallel with the transfor-
mation of tort law accomplished by Judge Hand and his economics-
inflected followers.72
67. See id. at 336.
68. See id. at 344 (discussing Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612 (1849)). 
69. See id. at 346 (citing REV. STAT., tit. 13, ch. 12, § 720, printed at 18 Stat., pt. 1, at 137
(1874)).
70. See id. at 346 & n.100 (quoting REV. STAT., tit. 13, ch. 12, § 720, printed at 18 Stat.,
pt. 1, at 137 (1874)).
71. For a mildly skeptical view of Mayton’s account, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL.,
HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1030 & n.1 (6th ed.
2009).
72. I shall shortly detail the changes in antitrust law that emerged as a result of efforts
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The leading antitrust statutes, the Sherman Act73 and the
Clayton Act,74 were the products of Populist and Progressive Era
politics, but in recent decades have been largely remade in response
to withering academic criticism of the case law as it had developed
under these laws.75 The basic problem, as explained most forcefully
by then-Professor Bork in The Antitrust Paradox, was that antitrust
law had been interpreted to frustrate bigness per se.76 From an
economic perspective, however, big is not necessarily bad. Larger
firms can take advantage of economies of scale that smaller firms
cannot effectively exploit. Yet, Bork argued, the antitrust doctrine
that the courts had fashioned had “inhibited or destroyed a broad
spectrum of useful business structures and practices” to the det-
riment of the consumers who would ultimately benefit from those
business structures and practices.77
To be sure, Bork also claimed support from the language and
legislative history of the antitrust laws themselves.They were not
originally intended to prohibit bigness as such, he claimed.78 Their
goal, Bork said, was to promote consumer welfare—that is, to forbid
only anticompetitive bigness.79 Bork no doubt overstated his his-
torical case. For example, he did not cite what was then and still
remains the leading history of the Sherman Act—Professor Letwin’s
Law and Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.80 Letwin provided a more nuanced account, in which
the Sherman Act emerged from a confluence of forces, including
traditional distrust of monopolies, political agitation against trusts,
like those of then-Professor Bork. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX
(1978). Lest there be any confusion, it should be noted that Bork strongly criticized Judge
Hand’s antitrust opinions for giving effect to values other than consumer welfare. See id. at
51-53. I am analogizing the courts’ recent behavior in antitrust cases to Judge Hand’s
behavior in earlier tort cases; I am not arguing that Judge Hand and the antitrust revisionists
agreed on antitrust issues.
73. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
74. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006). 
75. See BORK, supra note 72, at 50 (arguing for a clear definition of the economic goals of
antitrust law).
76. Id. at 54, 246-49.
77. Id. at 4.
78. See id. at 56-66.
79. See id. at 57, 61, 66.
80. WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT (1965).
2012] SPANDREL OR FRANKENSTEIN’S MONSTER? 355
faith in the common law, and any number of other motives, which
together produced an open-ended text.81 But, in any event, Bork’s
real problem with antitrust doctrine was not its supposed infidelity
to the original goals of the Congresses that passed the antitrust
laws. His aim was to displace a jumble of legal doctrines—and
especially those that promoted noneconomic goals—with a set of
doctrines organized around the unifying theme of economic effi-
ciency.82
Bork, along with others who voiced similar sentiments,83 enjoyed
wild success. Today, antitrust law has been virtually completely
transformed, as per se rules have been replaced by rules of reason
and, more broadly, the case law treats economic analysis as the
starting point and, effectively, the ending point of legal analysis.84
How should we understand the transformation of American
antitrust law? From the Borkian perspective, the original statutes
had spawned a Frankenstein’s monster—a set of doctrines that were
internally incoherent or worse, concerned about protecting small
business for no evident reason other than its smallness, at the cost
81. See id. at 53-99. Another source that Bork might have cited, but did not, is RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN
AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 199-200 (1965) (identifying political, as well as
social and moral, goals as complementing the economic motivation for the Sherman Act).
82. Throughout The Antitrust Paradox, Bork used terms like “consumer welfare,” e.g.,
BORK, supra note 72, at 9, and “general welfare,” e.g., id. at 10, as though they were
synonyms. They are not, and Bork’s prescriptions may be better suited towards maximizing
general or total welfare rather than consumer welfare. A schematic example illustrates the
difference. The combination of two relatively inefficient firms to form a more efficient
monopolist will not maximize consumer welfare if, even though the monopolist has lower
costs, it can charge a monopoly price that is higher than the market price previously charged
by the two less efficient firms. That result nonetheless maximizes total welfare because the
surplus redounds to shareholders in the resulting monopolist firm. In addressing a version
of this example, Bork worried about only net welfare, not consumer welfare as such. See id.
at 219. An antitrust doctrine more focused on consumer welfare would worry about
distributional effects between firms and consumers. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers
as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged,
50 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 875 (1999) (arguing that the antitrust laws are concerned primarily
with “preventing unfair acquisitions of consumers’ wealth by firms with market power”).
83. See, e.g., HAROLD DEMSETZ, THE MARKET CONCENTRATION DOCTRINE (1973) (arguing
against per se rules and much of the balance of older antitrust doctrine); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976) (analyzing antitrust issues from an
economic perspective).
84. See THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS
ORIGINS 465-895 (4th ed. 2009) (excerpting modern era cases taking an economic perspective
on antitrust law).
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of rendering the overall economy less productive.85 The transforma-
tion wrought by Bork and the other revisionists, in this view, was
less a matter of taking advantage of a spandrel than of slaying, or
at least hobbling, a monster.
Yet from another perspective, the revisionists’ reduction of anti-
trust to economics was itself the monstrous act.86 Maybe antitrust
law was originally adopted in order to serve noneconomic ends.
Maybe it was merely adaptable to such ends, in which case the
doctrine that had emerged by the middle of the twentieth century
was itself a useful spandrel. In either case, to make sense of this
perspective, one needs to understand why one might think that
antitrust can usefully serve noneconomic goals. That is not espe-
cially difficult.
One such goal could be social. National big-box retailers like
Walmart may be able to sell consumer goods at lower prices than
Main Street family stores, and in that sense enhance consumer wel-
fare, but antitrust law could be thought to embody a preference for
the sort of community fostered by neighbors purchasing their goods
from one another. Perhaps the intangible benefits of living in a
community with a thriving Main Street culture outweigh the cost of
higher prices charged by the less efficient Main Street stores. We
cannot rule this story out due to the fact that consumers in fact shop
at big-box stores because they face a collective action problem: no
single big-box store purchase kills off the Main Street culture, and
people benefit from that culture even when they do not shop on
Main Street. That, at least, is a possible account of one kind of social
benefit of a law that expresses hostility to bigness per se. 
Another noneconomic goal of antitrust law could be political. We
might worry that firms holding large concentrations of wealth will
use their wealth to corrupt democracy.87 In light of the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment doctrines limiting the ability of Congress
to curtail these political effects directly,88 restrictions on growth in
the size of accumulated wealth, whether through antitrust or
85. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
86. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
87. For an elaboration of this view, see Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979).
88. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (invalidating a federal
statute forbidding corporate-funded expenditures on campaign speech).
2012] SPANDREL OR FRANKENSTEIN’S MONSTER? 357
taxation policies, might be the most effective way of protecting
democracy from this kind of corruption.
Which perspective is correct? That depends on the answers to a
number of complex empirical and normative questions. What are
the social and political effects of different kinds of wealth concentra-
tion? How should we trade off total welfare for distributional con-
cerns? For democracy? What mix of legislative and judicial decision
making is appropriate to answering such questions?
I shall not attempt to resolve these questions today, but instead
simply note them, and move on to my final statutory example, which
will highlight that last institutional concern. I turn now to the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).89 The
statute authorizes both criminal prosecution for, and civil lawsuits
by victims of, any “pattern of racketeering activity,” defined as “at
least two” of a long list of criminal acts, including very serious vio-
lent offenses like murder, kidnapping, and arson, but also nonvio-
lent offenses like gambling, dealing in obscenity, and wire fraud.90
The diverse list of crimes covered by “racketeering activities”
reflects Congress’s effort to cover just about all of the activities in
which groups like the mafia engage, and the legislative history of
RICO makes clear that groups like the mafia were the original
target of the legislation.91
The best scholarly analysis of the legislative history of RICO,
performed by then-Professor and now-Second Circuit Judge Lynch,
shows that “Congress viewed RICO principally as a tool for attack-
ing the specific problem of infiltration of legitimate business by
organized criminal syndicates.”92 The Supreme Court, however, re-
jected that limitation as inconsistent with the statute’s language.93
Meanwhile, the statutory language covers more than the mafia. For
example, a person who hosts a couple of illegal poker games in his
basement has participated in an “enterprise”94 that conducts a
89. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).
90. Id. § 1961(1), (5).
91. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 76 (1969).
92. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal (pts. 1 & 2), 87 COLUM. L. REV.
661, 662 (1987).
93. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 584-85 (1981) (construing “enterprise”
to include wholly illegal as well as legal enterprises).
94. The statute also defines an enterprise to include an individual. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
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“pattern of racketeering activity,”95 making him potentially subject
to RICO. Judges and commentators have criticized the scope of
RICO,96 but it remains extraordinarily broad.
Well, so what? Perhaps Congress likes it that way. In other
words, whatever the original subjective expectations of the Congress
that first enacted RICO, if the fairest reading of the words that
Congress used goes beyond the intentions of Congress, then it is for
Congress, not the courts, to correct the error. Its failure to do so
suggests that Congress did not err or has, through inaction, ratified
the courts’ broad construction of RICO.
The view I have just articulated sounds in the theory of statutory
interpretation that is sometimes called “textualism,”97 which in turn
may be opposed by other theories, such as “intentionalism” and
“purposivism.”98 Intentionalists say that courts should treat the
words used by the legislature as significant only insofar as they
reflect the intent of the legislature.99 Intentionalism has fallen out
of favor in recent years, although it still has a small but hardy band
of defenders.100 More commonly, textualism does battle with pur-
posivism, which emphasizes the gaps and ambiguities in statutory
text, and argues that, in the famous words of Professors Hart and
Sacks, legislation should be presumed to be the output of “reason-
able men pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”101
I do not intend to referee the battle among textualism, inten-
tionalism, and purposivism today.102 Instead, I wish to point out how
95. See id. § 1961(5).
96. See, e.g., Adam B. Weiss, Note, From the Bonannos to the Bin Ladens: The Reves
Operation or Management Test and the Viability of Civil RICO Suits Against Financial
Supporters of Terrorism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1123, 1124 (2010) (noting “decades of criticism
and repeated efforts by the federal courts to constrain [RICO’s] reach”).
97. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2408
(2003) (“[M]odern textualism suggests that the complexities of the legislative process make
it meaningless to speak of a legislative ‘intent’ at odds with the intent expressed by the clear
social meaning of the enacted text.”).
98. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 117, 118-19 (2009) (contrasting textualism with intentionalism and purposivism).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?”
Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 971-72
(2004); Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L.REV. 629, 649-50 (2005). 
101. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1124-25 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
102. I have previously written that “the differences between ... textualism and purposivism
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that debate can be understood as a debate about spandrels and
Frankenstein’s monsters. Textualists, intentionalists, and purpos-
ivists argue about how courts ought to go about applying statutes to
circumstances that were not foreseen, or not foreseen perfectly, by
the statutes’ drafters.103 To take a tired but useful example, the
application of a prohibition on “vehicles in the park” to a functional
truck mounted on a pedestal as a memorial can be condemned as a
Frankenstein’s monster,104 whereas the application of the same
prohibition to a tricycle105—assumed for our purposes not to have
been considered by the prohibition’s adopters—may be a monster or
a spandrel, depending on where one comes out on a variety of
jurisprudential and other questions. 
To be clear, I am not taking sides in the Hart-Fuller debate.106
Rather, I mean to show only that issues that have been at the heart
of disputes over how to interpret statutes can be understood as
raising questions about the line between monsters and spandrels.
To followers of Fuller as well as Hart and Sacks, RICO looks like a
monster—a statute adopted for a limited purpose that, through a
fetishistic textualism, has been the basis for severe overcriminal-
ization and crippling liability for otherwise legitimate businesses.
By contrast, to modern textualists and those who follow in the
positivist footsteps of H.L.A. Hart, the modern interpretation of
RICO is, if not exactly a beautiful spandrel, largely unobjectionable
so long as that interpretation finds solid roots in the text, which it
pretty clearly does. Accordingly, the Frankenstein’s monster ques-
tion is, in an important sense, the central question of statutory
interpretation.
... mask the degree to which [their practitioners] proceed from similar assumptions.” Michael
C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112
HARV. L. REV. 4, 14 (1998). For a sharper delineation of the differences between textualism
and its rivals, see Siegel, supra note 98.
103. See Siegel, supra note 98, at 118-19.
104. See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630, 663 (1958).
105. See id. at 662.
106. For Fuller’s position, see id. For Hart’s, see H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL RETROFITTING
I turn, finally, to the topic of constitutional law. Here, too, we will
find that the spandrel versus monster question is ubiquitous. I shall
consider, in turn, three examples: judicial review, political parties,
and the Second Amendment.
A familiar story holds that John Marshall arrogated the power of
judicial review to the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison.107
Scholars have discredited that story by pointing, among other
places, to the text of Article III, which, as Marshall himself noted,
and as Professor Wechsler later emphasized, empowers the federal
courts to hear all cases arising under the Constitution;108 to
Federalist No. 78, which laid before the ratifying public a set of
arguments that largely anticipated Marbury;109 and to pre-1787
antecedents of judicial review, which showed that the concept was
familiar.110 These and other sorts of arguments make clear that
critics cannot credibly portray the institution of judicial review as
a Frankenstein’s monster because of some sin committed by John
Marshall.
107. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
108. Id. at 147; Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1959).
109. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). John Marshall himself made much the
same argument in the Virginia ratifying convention. See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 553 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 1987) (“If [the government of the United States] were to make a law not warranted by any
of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the
Constitution which they are to guard. They would not consider such a law as coming under
their jurisdiction. They would declare it void.”). 
110. See Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502,
504 (2006) (arguing that the practice of voiding legislation repugnant to the Constitution
developed from the English practice of limiting corporate ordinances that were contrary to the
law); see also Barbara Aronstein Black, An Astonishing Political Innovation: The Origins of
Judicial Review, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 692-93 (1988) (noting that eighteenth-century
Americans knew of provisions requiring a hierarchy of law such that laws made by dependent
law-making bodies were void if repugnant to the laws of England, and that such laws’
conformity to the laws of England was a question for the judiciary); Saikrishna B. Prakash
& John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 899 (2003) (arguing
that there was a “shared understanding at the time of the framing that judicial review was
an appropriate judicial authority”); William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before
Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 457-58 (2005) (analyzing pre-Marbury case law and
concluding that the doctrine of judicial review was commonly applied to invalidate statutes).
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But if usurpation is a myth, a puzzle remains: given its relative
institutional weakness, how did the Supreme Court succeed in
building a power base so that today’s political actors—especially
Congress and the President—routinely accept the authority of its
decisions even when they disagree? Here the Frankenstein story
may be relevant after all.
Consider a recent article by Professors Delaney and Friedman.111
They contend that the Court built up its prestige in the nineteenth
century by allying itself with federal actors and against the states.112
National actors, in this narrative, benefited from a strong Court
because antebellum judicial review was chiefly a tool for bringing
states in line with federal policy.113 Congress and the President
benefited from what Delaney and Friedman call “vertical” judicial
supremacy.114 But like Dr. Frankenstein, the national political
actors were unable to control their creation, which eventually
turned on its creators, and by then it was too late.115 The arguments
that had been used to establish the Court’s legitimacy when acting
against the states also served to establish its legitimacy against the
federal government, giving rise to the monster of “horizontal” sup-
remacy.116
The story that Delaney and Friedman tell is not uncontroversial.
For example, it does not explain why sophisticated national political
actors were not alert to the possibility that they were creating a
monster they would prove unable to control. After all, Marbury was
decided in 1803, and although the Court would not invalidate an-
other federal statute until 1857, the case in which it did so, Dred
Scott v. Sandford,117 was momentous.
Perhaps the key is that Marbury was, in its day, chiefly a marker
of judicial weakness, not strength,118 whereas Dred Scott was
111. Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation of
Judicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137 (2011).
112. See id. at 1152-59.
113. Id. at 1158.
114. Id. at 1149-50, 1157.
115. Id. at 1166-72.
116. See id. at 1140. There are additional steps in the story as told by Delaney and
Friedman, but the text sets forth the broad outline.
117. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
118. See Michael W. McConnell, The Story of Marbury v. Madison: Making Defeat Look
Like Victory, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 13 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009).
362 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:339
decided after the Court had already garnered the support of
erstwhile critics like Andrew Jackson.119 Or perhaps it is naïve to
imagine that political actors involved in the controversies of their
day would worry themselves much over the unintended conse-
quences that might befall their successors as a result of steps that
concretely benefited them at present. Faced with the opportunity to
advance the goals of his own presidency at the cost of potentially
weakening the presidency (relative to the courts) at some point in
the distant future, we might expect any president to prioritize his
or her own agenda.
In any event, even if the dynamic Delaney and Friedman identify
only partly accounts for the development of judicial supremacy,120 it
surely counts for something. The evolution of judicial supremacy in
the United States was complex, but the Frankenstein’s monster
theme was a piece of it.
When I say that judicial supremacy was a Frankenstein’s mon-
ster, I do not mean to make a normative judgment. I am claiming
—or rather, Delaney and Friedman claim—that horizontal judicial
supremacy is a monster, from the perspective of Congress and the
President. So far as the system as a whole or the American people
are concerned, horizontal judicial supremacy may well be a
beautiful spandrel, an institution that evolved to serve the needs of
national political actors and that has been “exapted” to hold those
very actors accountable to the law.
Indeed, it is not even accurate to say that horizontal supremacy
is a monster from the perspective of the President or Congress. It
would be more accurate to say that, on average, horizontal suprem-
acy constrains national political actors,121 but in any given case that
may be fine with any given actor because judicial supremacy is also
being used to constrain a rival actor. Thus, Republicans in Congress
who opposed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act122 fa-
vorably viewed horizontal judicial supremacy as a potential means
of scoring a victory through constitutional litigation that eluded
119. See Friedman & Delaney, supra note 111, at 1156 & n.95.
120. See id. at 1193.
121. See id. at 1140.
122. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
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them in the legislative process.123 Likewise, the Obama administra-
tion has adopted an enforce-but-do-not-defend approach to the
Defense of Marriage Act124 as a means of enlisting the courts in
striking down the law—a result it almost certainly could not achieve
through legislation.
These familiar political dynamics rest on the ideological opposi-
tion of political parties, which are themselves either spandrels or
Frankenstein’s monsters. The Framers, especially James Madison,
were hostile to political parties,125 but they fashioned a system of
government that all but guaranteed the emergence of such parties.
To be sure, we may regard the fact that the United States has
usually had only two major national parties in any given era as a
function of a subconstitutional phenomenon: Article I leaves states
free to allocate House members among geographical districts or to
use at-large districts for the state as a whole.126 Today, only the
seven smallest states have at-large districts consisting of one rep-
resentative for the entire state.127 In earlier periods, however, some
states allocated multiple seats to at-large districts.128 Had they
combined that allocation with a proportional representation system
for choosing the representatives, third parties might well have
emerged, as they do in parliamentary systems with proportional
123. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Bondurant & Steven D. Henry, Constitutional Challenges to the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 249, 249-50 (2011) (noting that
all Republicans in both the Senate and the House of Representatives voted against passage
of the Act).
124. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)), invalidated by Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010); see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Statement of the Attorney Gen. on Litig. Involving the Def. of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-222.html. 
125. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 53 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (describing
the vice of “faction”).
126. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. l.
127. These seven states are Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Vermont, and Wyoming. U.S. Census Bureau, Apportionment Data, U.S. CENSUS 2010,
http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-data-text.php (last visited Oct. 15,
2012). 
128. Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out: A Legal Standard for Imposing Alternative Electoral
Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 333, 336 n.12 (1998)
(“Historically, from the late 18th century through 1967, a number of states elected
representatives at large or from multi-seat districts.”); see also Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Laura
Jane Durfee, Leaving the Thicket at Last?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 417, 432 (noting that at-
large elections were “even encouraged” in the 1960s). 
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representation. The existence of a stable two-party system can thus
be attributed to the subconstitutional choice of states to hold first-
past-the-post elections for each of their congressional seats, in light
of Duverger’s Law.129
Accordingly, it would be an overstatement to treat the two-party
system itself as an unintended but inevitable consequence of the
Constitution. Yet the existence of political parties at all probably
should be counted as such a consequence. Perhaps parties are
unnecessary for politics on the scale of the New England town
meeting, but it is nearly impossible to imagine politics on a national
or even statewide scale without political parties or their equivalent
to coordinate, organize, and communicate political views among the
people. Accordingly, there is no good reason to argue over whether
political parties are a Frankenstein’s monster or a spandrel. They
are an inevitability.
The Supreme Court cases involving political parties do not
uniformly reflect an awareness of the forces that give rise to and
shape parties. As Professor Pildes has noted, much of the Court’s
doctrine in this area treats American democracy as though it were
Weimar Germany,130 with an unstable mix of fractious voices con-
stantly on the verge of plunging us into the sort of chaos from which
a dictator might emerge. The truth, however, is more nearly the
opposite: our two major parties exert a near stranglehold on political
power. The most that political outsiders can hope is that they may
be able to force some issue onto the agenda of the major parties.
Once they have succeeded in doing so, however, their power ends.
Or, as historian Richard Hofstadter aptly put it: “Third parties are
like bees: once they have stung, they die.”131
129. See Marc John Randazza, The Other Election Controversy of Y2K: Core First
Amendment Values and High-Tech Political Coalitions, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 143, 161 (2004)
(noting that Duverger’s Law recognizes that “the simple-majority and single-ballot (SMSB)
system ... directs voting behavior in a manner that prefers a two-party system”).
130. Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 128 & n.424 (2004) (“In
cases involving democratic issues, both momentous and mundane, the current Court has acted
out of concern that judicial review is needed to ensure that democracy remains stable, orderly,
and properly restrained.” This concern reflects “views about whether American democracy ...
entails acceptable chaos and tumult or requires greater structure and order.”). 
131. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 97 (1955).
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If the two-party system was an inevitable side effect of the
Constitution, other features are less clear cut. For my final example,
I turn to the Second Amendment. As you know, it states: “A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”132
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that it
protects the right of individuals to possess firearms for self-
defense.133 In the course of reaching that conclusion, Justice Scalia
began by construing “keep and bear” in the “operative” clause of the
Second Amendment to mean “possess and carry,”134 and then went
on to address the fact that the “prefatory” language states a purpose
for the clause that has nothing to do with individual self-defense.135
Justice Scalia himself said that the purpose of the Second Amend-
ment was “to prevent elimination of the militia.”136 He then said
that the means chosen to achieve that purpose—banning the federal
government from disarming the people—must be given effect,
because that is what the text protects.137
To be sure, Justice Scalia attempted to show that protecting the
common law right of self-defense was also one of the core purposes
of the Second Amendment right, but his argument on this point was
obscure: he characterized the dissent’s historical argument as
showing merely “that self-defense had little to do with the right’s
codification,” but said that this showing ignores that self-defense
“was the central component of the right itself.”138
Suppose, however, that one agrees with the Heller dissenters that
protection of firearms possession for purposes of self-defense was
mostly a by-product, rather than the core purpose or “central
component” of the Second Amendment.139 We then have a peculiar
situation in which the Second Amendment today serves only a
function that is extraneous to its original core purpose. The
Congress that adopted the Bill of Rights worried that a disarmed
132. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
133. 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
134. See id. at 592.
135. See id. at 599.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 714-15 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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people would be unable to resist a tyrant with force.140 Today, as
Justice Scalia acknowledged, “it may be true that no amount of
small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and
tanks.”141 But still, he concluded, “the fact that modern develop-
ments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause
and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the
right.”142
Why not? Justice Scalia does not exactly say in Heller, but he and
other textualist judges and scholars have long made the argument
in other contexts: laws are rarely coextensive with their background
justifications;143 when the two diverge, courts should enforce the law
as written, rather than its background justification.144 And for most
of those who hold that view of legal texts, it applies to constitutional
provisions no less than to other kinds of law.145
Accordingly, we might associate textualism with an embrace of
spandrels and Frankenstein’s monsters, while associating antifor-
malist conceptions of law with the urge to hew closer to purposes.
That association certainly is available as an explanation of Heller.
The dissenters argued that the majority’s recognition of an individ-
ual right to self-defense was inconsistent with, and thus unautho-
rized by, the core purpose of the Second Amendment, which was to
protect state militias.146 Thus, the ideological divisions in Heller
appear to map reasonably well onto the association over the last
140. See id. at 598-99 (majority opinion).
141. Id. at 627.
142. Id. at 627-28.
143. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 545-47
(1983) (arguing that the inevitable imprecision of a statutory rule “is not a good reason for a
court ... to add or subtract from [the rule]”).
144. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 135 (1991) (“Where there is entrenchment,
agents decide ... in accordance with the indications of the [generalization that constitutes the
rule] even when doing so produces results divergent from and inferior to those that would be
produced by direct application of the background justification.”). Schauer is a positivist rather
than a textualist, see Randy E. Barnett, The Intersection of Natural Rights and Positive
Constitutional Law, 25 CONN. L. REV. 853 (1993), but for present purposes we may overlook
that subtle distinction.
145. See William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original
Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 488 (2007).
146. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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several decades between conservatives and textualism, on the one
hand, and liberals and purposivism, on the other hand.147
But matters are considerably more complicated because liberal
judges and Justices tend to embrace dynamic interpretation,
whereas conservative judges and Justices tend to embrace origi-
nalism, or at least to give greater emphasis to arguments rooted in
original understanding than liberals do.148 Originalists frequently
criticize nonoriginalist decisions on the ground that such decisions
depart from the text’s original meaning, which, in practice—if not
always in theory—will incorporate the Framers’ and ratifiers’
original purposes.149 Thus, in many contexts, conservatives accuse
liberals of seeing what the liberals regard as spandrels in nooks and
crannies of the constitutional text that, the conservatives say, do not
exist. In many such cases, the conservatives also appear to think
that the liberals’ interpretation gives rise to a Frankenstein’s
monster, not a spandrel.
It is thus tempting to say that in constitutional law, as in law
more generally, the difference between a spandrel and a monster
—as well as the legitimacy of interpreting a text to go beyond its
purpose—simply depends on whose ox is being gored, and surely it
does. But if one thinks, as I do, that jurisprudential arguments are
not entirely a mask for ideological and other nonlegal consider-
ations, then one will take seriously what courts say and do about
spandrels and Frankenstein’s monsters.
CONCLUSION
Of course, courts do not literally say anything about spandrels
and Frankenstein’s monsters because those are not legal catego-
ries—at least not yet! But as I have endeavored to show in this
Lecture, spandrels and monsters loom large in American jurispru-
147. See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text (discussing the different views).
148. See James Greene et al., Essay, Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 360,
373, 378, 392 (2011) (contrasting the conservative originalist view with the liberal “living
Constitution” view).
149. See John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the
Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378-81 (2007) (arguing that the original
meaning of the Constitution will typically overlap with the original purposes of its Framers
and ratifiers).
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dence. Without exploring other legal systems, it is impossible for me
to say whether American law is especially fertile ground for span-
drels and monsters, but—assuming one could come up with a
sufficiently rigorous definition of spandrels and monsters—it would
not surprise me to learn that the United States is somewhat of an
outlier.
For one thing, judicial decision making in common law systems
tends towards evolution over time. To be sure, the common lawyer’s
view of continental systems as completely lacking precedent is
overly simplistic. Still, the formal need to always refer back to the
code probably limits drift in continental systems, whereas legal
principles in a common law system have no fixed point of contact
with an original text, and thus can drift indefinitely.
But even more than in other legal systems based in the English
common law, we are likely to see monsters and spandrels in
American law for reasons of necessity. The American Constitution
is notoriously difficult to amend, but strong separation of powers
and multiple veto gates lead to a sclerotic process for making
subconstitutional law as well. As times change but laws remain the
same, once-sensible laws may become Frankenstein’s monsters.
Meanwhile, if one assumes relatively constant demand for legal
adaptation across legal systems, then the blockages that prevent
change to formal legal text in the United States will lead to legal
change occurring by other means.150 In other words, because it is so
difficult for the political process to change the law, American courts
more frequently try to retrofit existing law than do courts in legal
systems that allow formal text to change more readily.
To repeat, however, I have not conducted the sort of study that
would be needed to validate these comparative speculations, and
doing so poses formidable challenges.151 What I hope I have done is
150. See ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 163-64,167
(2009) (discussing means, such as judicial review and interpretation, employed throughout
history to change the United States Constitution without formal amendment of the text); Tom
Ginsburg et al., The Lifespan of Written Constitutions, THE REC. ONLINE, Spring 2009,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/lifespan (“If the methods of securing formal
amendment are difficult (as in the United States ... ), there may be pressures to adapt the
constitution through judicial interpretation.”).
151. Ran Hirschl’s work is an example of the sort of study one would need to conduct. RAN
HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY (2004). Hirschl looks closely at the relatively recent
adoption and implementation of rights-based judicial review in four common law countries:
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to persuade you of the importance of spandrels and Frankenstein’s
monsters in American law.
Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and South Africa. Id. at 4-5. His work is elegant and conducted
at the right level of detail to provide insights about the questions he asks, but the question
about which I am speculating is broader along two dimensions: first, I am interested in
spandrels and monsters across the range of law, not just with respect to constitutional rights;
and second, to generate a reliable answer to the question about which I am speculating in the
text, one would need to look at a great many legal systems. None of that is meant as a
criticism of Hirschl’s first-rate study. I mean only to emphasize how truly speculative my
concluding thoughts are.
